It is an unprecedented decision as it is risky. After months of agonising over what to do about Myanmar, a group of Asean members has pushed the regional organisation to castigate a fellow member state.
A delicately worded statement released on Oct 16 by Brunei, the current chair, announced that Asean had decided to exclude Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from Asean summits. Myanmar had been asked to nominate a "non-political representative", instead.
What a "non-political representative" means and whether Myanmar will nominate one remains to be seen. It is conceivable that Myanmar will simply give the summits a miss. On this score, the chair's statement noted "reservations from the Myanmar representative".
The move reflects festering impatience of at least five members – the most vocal are Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – over Myanmar's lack of progress in implementing Asean's five-point consensus designed to demonstrate a modicum of effort to return Myanmar to normalcy following the Feb 1 coup.
The fact that other member states agreed to this remarkable step, however grudgingly, shows the realisation of the risk to Asean's reputation has finally struck home.
Since the coup and as shots were fired at protesters in city after town after village in Myanmar, observers have repeatedly warned that inaction by Asean is simply untenable.
Earlier this month, the United Nations secretary-general postponed a meeting with Asean foreign ministers, fearing that being in the same virtual room as the Myanmar representative would amount to lending legitimacy to the junta.
Asean's dialogue partners from the West would similarly be reluctant to participate in meetings that involve Myanmar.
Uncertainties over whether their leaders would show up for the East Asia Summit — always held back to back with an Asean Summit — may have helped tip the balance against Min Aung Hlaing's attendance.
A decision by, say, United States President Joe Biden not to show up or instead, send a junior representative, would cast a pall over Asean's much vaunted "centrality" in regional affairs.
For Myanmar's military leaders, Asean's decision will doubtless be seen as a stinging rebuke. Membership in Asean plays a part in bolstering the regime's legitimacy, providing political cover which the Tatmadaw, as the Myanmar armed forces are known, has exploited successfully thus far.
Asean also expands Myanmar's options on the international stage. The country perennially worries about being overly dependent on relations with China and India.
Nevertheless, Asean's ability to influence Myanmar's generals remains limited. The Tatmadaw may feel they need to emerge on top of this to survive as an institution. They remain disinclined to compromise.
Not inviting the State Administration Council (SAC), the name the Myanmar junta calls itself, to the summit may signal Asean's frustration with Naypyidaw, but does little to mitigate the crisis there or its regional ramifications. Asean needs to take stock and strategise.
First, it is important to maintain a balanced approach. Where it was previously criticised for being all carrot and no stick, it must ensure that the stick is used strategically and sparingly, meaning Asean must continue to engage with the junta.
Second, while Asean may not be able to engage the exiled National Unity Government openly, this should not prevent member states from reaching out. Some already have.
Asean member states, in cooperation with key dialogue partners like India, China and Japan, can work on a dual-track process of encouraging political reconciliation and a more transparent and unhindered system of aid delivery.
Third, seeing how the troubles in Myanmar look set to beguile the region for the long term, Asean must set up a working group on Myanmar, which also consists of Track Two and civil society practitioners who can function continuously without depending on the rotating position of the chair.
This does not entail minimising the leadership or coordinating efforts of the chair, but will instead, allow for greater degree of continuity and coherence in engagement with Myanmar.
Asean, therefore, needs to engage in and sustain multiple tracks of initiatives for there to be even the slightest chance of success.
It will be a complex endeavour and concurrent coordinated approaches needs to be in place.
Identifying and engaging with experienced partners from the government and non-governmental sector would ensure a better chance for a managed, balanced and cooperative approach towards a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
The writer is chief executive of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the New Straits Times
